Our first intelligence
Stephen Curkpatrick


Where among all the variegated expressions of phenomena do we find the meaning of life?

If we begin with the stuff close at hand, we soon discover that others have different conclusions about the very basic phenomena of life, such as growth, decay, birth and death that surround them. We can accumulate all the phenomena we like as data toward a conclusion but this is always only a limited aggregate of stuff, given our finite reach, time and purview of all things. This is one quest for meaning within all the variegated phenomena of life.

Alternatively, an ideological view nominates an idea or abstract concept through which to interpret all phenomena. This too remains problematic, although it gives cohesion to seeming limitless combinations and conclusions that could not be made merely by immersing ourselves in phenomena in the hope of finding its meaning. Ultimately, humans do work from some form of interpretive axiom in assimilating potentially limitless and therefore unwieldy phenomena.

The concept of multiple intelligences is an attempt to elevate the first possibility—exposure to a wide variety of phenomena, against the tyranny of the second—a certain arbitrary concept that gives definition to phenomena. Yet the first is always implicated in a tacit axiom ordering any selection of phenomena. This is the perennial focus of epistemology—how we know what we know—and the issue of first intelligence, which is engaged from Plato to Augustine, Kant to Levinas.

That people have engaged the world through a variety of senses is no new thing. Sight, sound and touch were as prominent in perceiving the nature of life before Plato’s time as they are today. A Mozart opera exhibits a complex range of human capacities for intelligence. These capacities are never singularly demarcated so that we can see what pure musical intelligence or any other singular intelligence might look like, except in instances of personality dysfunction, where for example, the singular focus of genius displaces other areas of human capacity, such as conscience or love. The same applies to any singular human capacity. Intelligence is always part of a complex range of relational, social and reflective skills.

Aware of a range of capacities in human intelligence that can be deployed and to which people respond, Levinas maintained that the vocative or personal address is the first intelligence with which we engage life. In this, he appealed to the pervasive vocative character of biblical testimony.

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The vocative gives our first intelligence because being addressed by another, not by the world of things but by relationship(s), is primary to all other durable intelligence about life. Information may be exchanged but an event occurs beyond what is seen as tangible. The phenomenon of being addressed by another person precedes any subsequent correlation of facts as to who or what status this person is by reference to a context.

In the vocative, I am addressed by another as unique as myself. I may see this person but beyond seeing is the inner event that goes unseen as heard—the event of address. I am addressed by a particular person, however incidentally this occurs, who is in proximity to my existence—not a hypothetical parent, partner, child, sibling, friend or colleague, but this person here at this time.

I exist as someone who is addressed among many others who likewise have as their primary locale of meaningful existence the fact of being addressed by others. No one is merely constituted as a bundle of facts and statistics. The vocative establishes me as a person, which precedes any such data about my material existence within phenomena.

Being addressed by another, I am also held to account by another, which occurs at various levels of ethical response as responsibility, whether this responsibility is ultimately appropriate and accepted or not. Whatever transacts in the acceptance or rejection of responsibility occurs through the initial prism of vocative address or summons by another and in turn, my volitional response.

As volitional, response to another human being is particular. It is a response to the vocative, even if no words are uttered. By responding or ignoring, I answer another who has addressed me. The vocative gives me a unique relationship to every other, who is also unique beyond generic nomination—social, racial, economic—but as addressed and summoned by another to some form of personal response.

Vocative address invokes hearing and response—an interpretive process in which deliberative choice is called forth in the one addressed, unlike nomination, which relates to collation and systemisation, and does not require a moral volitional decision unless the vocative enters. The vocative requires a relational or social response, which is therefore intrinsically ethical.

Phenomena may be correlated and ordered into data that is then applied to certain use. This use in the context of others will involve interpretation that extends well beyond the first procedure—collating and ordering—and ultimately involves the vocative. Interpreted data in the social realm will become a question of: What is my response—acceptance, rejection, obedience or refusal? It will be vocative.

Just so, in biblical testimony, God of time and interaction with human life encounters human beings in the exigencies of their temporal identity and experience. A living, eventful encounter is signified. It functions pervasively in the vocative register of human experience. It is therefore always interpreted, volitional and significant for existence.

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Vocative encounter precedes anything aesthetic based on appearances. Instead, it is already volitional, relational and ethical, even if adorned with the aesthetic, which is seen and appreciated for having heard in inheriting a social language of aesthetic judgment. Language is always and already ahead of us in the vocative.

Because any person is addressed in the specificity of existence by this partner, child, parent or sibling, we are always located within a particular vocative constellation that is unique. I do not share the same parents with my partner even if we share the same children but not the same experience of their natality or the same gender with each child.

This context of human relationships is as if arbitrarily given, yet I am completely responsible because every instance of the arbitrary—this one and not another person before me, beside me, with me—calls me to responsibility and therefore accountability. This arbitrary mystery of our first intelligence is inherently relational and ethical, preceding either phenomena or ideology, as a vocative encounter responding to volitional factors in the midst of acting subjects.

Our first intelligence is invoked eventfully through another word, which is a word otherwise than our own, coming from beyond my powers to assimilate phenomena by aggregate or ideal. This other word, even as it is articulated in familiar words, is intrinsic to a form of knowing that is exposed in vulnerability and trust to another as genuine other.

The supreme expression of our experience of a word otherwise is triune, unaccounted for in human ideals or cultural phenomena, yet interpreting all ideals and phenomena within the first intelligence of the vocative Word who became flesh, to encounter us wholly in grace and truth.

 

Method sources: The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology; Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence; Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other.