Is God in two minds about us?
Stephen Curkpatrick


Is God in two minds about us? There are several interlocking factors that suggest this, even for religious people.

Humans have always cast God in a script or role that is amenable, which is the essence of idolatry and adamantly resisted in biblical testimony. This is also a modern propensity, for revelation is deemed neither to be rationally feasible nor relevant within a milieu of relative truth. Even if not believed, “God” is nevertheless a projection of incompetence that either cannot or will not deliver human happiness. Atheists too, cast their scripts for God to play.

If we are in two minds about ourselves, which a burgeoning industry promoting a quest for the self suggests, then this will be inscribed in human projections of God or whatever divine reality this name denotes. Such divinity will also be in two minds about us. This scenario is not hypothetical. In a medieval analogy to the human will, which was perceived to be ineffective, the will of God is divided from its effects. God’s will is also ineffective.

If the will or word of God is one thing and its expression for human life is another, God can only be in two minds about us. Yet if God is in two minds about us, affirmations of the sure word or promises of God in biblical testimony in general and by Christian witness in particular are of no consequence.

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The division of God’s will from its effects, Luther observed, is a ruse that projects ambiguity in the human will onto God, so that human ambiguity is given legitimacy by presumed ambiguity in God’s will. This ruse is also unwittingly presumed in modern conjectures of ultimate reality, whether framed religiously or not.

Within popular assertions of religious relativity, any religion’s projection of ultimate reality is as feasible as any other. It is therefore plausible to speak of divinity as relative to diverse human cultural, social and philosophical scripts for human life. Divinity or ultimate reality is diversely projected and evaluated from these.

It is not an exceptional idea that an ultimate will could only endorse human harmony. Yet if such a will is identified with various social mechanisms and cultural phenomena as the means for achieving global harmony, which is conveyed in religious and secular aspirations alike, experience of this desire as stymied implies the ineffectiveness of an ultimate will, however this is conceived.

Dissonance within an ultimate will is located in inadequate social systems or perhaps the intrigues of rogue tribes. Whether expressed religiously or not, these are responsible for ultimate intention being divided from its tangible effects in human life.

Deputed right mechanisms of human phenomena are attributed ultimate will and power to redeem or to make good the problems of human life. Yet these are ineffective in achieving this because tacitly, such mechanisms only reflect human competencies and prejudices. In this way, ultimate intention is divided from its effects, as divine will is divided from its effects in medieval sophistry.

Conjectures concerning a divine will or ultimate intention, whether projected into heaven or cast over human phenomena, are meaningless if finally, they are ineffective. Such conjectures are impervious to conflicted human volition and the necessity of redemption to which Christian faith gives testimony.

Recognising both the capacity for human compromise within self-justifying hubris and our need of grace is essential to knowing ourselves by the sure word of God. Can we know human dignity without a word otherwise than our own prevaricating but self-justifying will? Whether religious or political, any conjecture concerning divine will is already undone by aligning human competencies and phenomena with the projected effectiveness of these conjectures, in whatever cosmic script they are written.

Conjectures of divinity founder on the implicit supposition that whatever is of ultimate value, shares our attributes and aspirations.

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To be in two minds about ourselves, as a pervasive quest for the “true self” suggests, is looking for grace that can never be found in convoluted scripts written from the self.

The ability to make decisions is not real freedom if it cannot embrace what it wills without prevarication or reluctance. Even in the things we choose to do, we are invariably compromised, whether by omission, diminution or error. “Divinity” cast in our own image—in heaven or on earth, as religious or atheist, for it makes no final difference—shares this same ambiguity.

To cast God in our own image, Luther argued, is to attribute God with no real power at all and to divide the will of God from its effects. As an attempt to endorse human autonomy and distinction, casting God in our image only enslaves us to our own scripts. Any assumption that we are wholly free, even if our freedom is not always effective, fails to recognise the fallacy of justifying our lives as self-standing from our compromised existence.

Contrary to becoming enmeshed in religious conjectures seeking to discern a divine will that is merely a reflection of human will, Christian testimony speaks of human compromise in sinfulness and the necessity of salvation promised in the sure word of God.

There is dissonance within humans between willing and doing, willing and willing effectively to do, or even knowing what is to be willed. God’s will, by contrast, is consistent as gracious and righteous; it is wholly effective and not impeded in its promises.

Humans can resist grace but not the will of God. God’s righteousness will be accomplished, even if by the “left hand” in which, by apparent concession to evil, God remains just. For example, Judah exiled in Babylon is the will of God, yet Babylon remains culpable for this captivity; Judas in Gethsemane advances the will of God, yet he remains culpable for his act of betrayal.

Unlike us and any analogy projected onto divinity—what God wills, God gives effect to. The will of God is effective. This is essential to the saving promises of God—what God wills, God will do. Faith depends on God’s veracity. If God wills and gives effect to what is willed as promised, God does not prevaricate over us.

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It is a consistent human propensity to script ideals to be played on a divine stage, whether this is other-worldly or this-worldly, explicit or implicit. Yet by doing so, intrinsic ambiguity is installed—ambiguity that runs through our own existence within our volition, competence and actions.

The propensity to cast divinity in a role that is amenable to human life, reflecting specific yet contested social and religious values, effectively projects divinity in two minds about us and humans in two minds about God. To project an ultimate will in our own image is unwittingly, to cast it with ambiguity as reflecting ambiguity in human life.

Humans are never wholly singular in motive and expression of their highest ideals and essential imperatives. Human self-compromise demonstrates this; human quest for the true self within the self, compounds this. Projecting this into God only destroys the possibility of response to God who is for us in love.

By contrast to God being in two minds about us, because cast in our own image, God who calls to be things that are not in giving life, time and possibility for response to a vocative call toward righteousness as gift, calls us to recognise our necessary transformation through love that is without prevarication.

Christian scepticism concerning the veracity and freedom of God—that is, the word of God—is a contradiction. The good news of God’s love in Jesus Christ declares that God is not in two minds about us. For this reason, we need not be in two minds about declaring such good news.

 
Primary source: Luther “Bondage of the Will”